Change Everything No 76: Foregrounding the 'Rest of the World' in geopolitics

Bobo Lo acknowledges the old order has broken down and that we now need a 'society of peoples' rather than a 'society of states'

© Natalie Bennett (Gel plate print)

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For Bristol and environs diaries - looking forward to this #ChangeEverything event in July with Andrew Kelly, former Director at Bristol Ideas. All welcome. Limited tickets!! Thanks Heron Books for supporting.

A ‘society of peoples’ rather than a ‘society of states’

To write a book now about the geopolitical situation requires courage: will what you have written be entirely overtaken by events by the time it gets through the editorial process?

So Bobo Lo, formerly of the respected thinktank Chatham House, now Australian-based, and a former Australian diplomat, deserves credit for effort alone in The Disorderly Society: Rethinking Global Governance in An Age of Anarchy, published by Columbia University Press this month. It was obviously updated very late into the process, including President Trump’s claims on Canada, the Panama Canal and Greenland (if not recent events in Venezuela).

But also credit is due for thinking outside the box far more than many can yet manage. And for the kind of bluntness that is all too rare (and is - I’ve found - a particularly Australian characteristic.) Such as a brutal, but accurate, assessment of the UK’s place in the world:

“The popular notion that the United Kingdom can be a bridge between America and Europe is a conceit, as is the strange hankering for the label of ‘superpower’ (in connection with AI, defence, development etc). Lack of self-awareness is compounded by an unreconstructed understanding of power and influence in the modern world. If Britain is to be a 21st-century force, it will not be by rigidly adhering to conventional metrics, such as military might and geopolitical projection. Britain’s comparative advantages do not lie in hard power. Four SSBNs (nuclear ballistic missile submarines), a couple of aircraft carriers, a modest-sized army and a smattering of overseas bases do not a great power make. Sending an aircraft carrier through the South China Sea or ramping up defence spending will do nothing to alter this. Nor will hugging the United States even tighter. To exercise significant influence, the United Kingdom must recast itself as a different kind of power. Although it needs to bolster its defence capabilities, it should build on its comparative advantages in other areas. That means expanding its world-class scientific and technological research capabilities, including in AI, consolidating its position as a global provider of tertiary education; disseminating British culture through outletrs such as the BBC; setting the pace in the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy; and being generous with humanitarian assistance to developing countries.” (pp. 96-7)

I don’t necessarily agree with everything he says (AI, at least as currently constructed is a cash cow fantasy and the direction of far too much science research is based on failed 20th-century thinking), but this is a useful book to think with. And it has some very good ideas about transformational change.

“States will remain the primary actors in the international system. But a state-centred order cannot be maintained on the same basis as before - through topdown direction and management by national governments. Increasingly, the viability is contingent on multiple players - non-state actors and civil society, as well as political elites - identifying a direct stke in positive outcomes and working together to make them happen. If there is to be an international society of the future, it will not resembly the relatively narrow ‘society of states’ described by Hedley Bull half a century ago. It will be a much broader and more diverse society of peoples linked by shared interests and aspirations.” (p. 142)

And while he’s still stuck in the idea that it will be decades before the real crisis hits, he acknowledges that one of the push factors towards that will be the climate emergency and particularly issues with food and water security. “The universality, extreme gravity and immediacy of such problems will push them to the top of the agenda. Driven by self-interest and the instinct for political survival, governments will have to find ways of working with each other, overriding their political and ideological differences.” (p. 145)

His vision is not of a world controlled by “Great Powers”.

“The persistence of the great power delusion is reflected in the renewed emphasis on ‘Concerts’: the premise of which is that a (self-) chosen few can given time and patience, arrive at a strategic accommodation based on a reasonable balance of interests. However, there is nothing to suggest that the 21st-century global agenda - from non-traditional security threats such as climate change to long-standing preoccupations like conflict management - can be addressed through plutocratic mechanisms constructed for very different times and circumstances. Any attempt to ignore this reality will meet fierce and sustained resistance, especially from those excluded from the magic circle. The rest of the world will not accept dictation from their supposed betters, especially where the latter have so amply demonstrated their failings.” (p. 56)

And he’s also Australia-blunt about the claim to any kind of “rule-based order” in past decades. How can that be claimed when Saudi Arabia was welcomed into the international community - and not just as a customer for massive arms sales (although particularly for that)? And while the US continued to fling its weight around just however it chose, often with only the thinnest of justifications.

“It is tempting to seek comfort in the thought that a world where rules and norms are sometimes observed is better than having no rules at all. But there are rwo obvious problems with this Panglossian attitude. One is that chronic cherry-picking of rules negates the whole idea of a rules-based order; how much rule-breaking and rule-bending is sustainable before order collapses into disorder. Second, an a la carte approach to the observance of rules invites whataboutism, enabling governments to justify their behaviour on the grounds that it is, at the very least, no worse than that of their critics.

Looking ahead, the biggest challenge of order is to conceptualize it in more generous and inclusive terms. For only then will it become more than an abstraction and acquire practical substance and influence. That necessitates looking at international norms and rules through a different, more positive lens - less an irksome restriction on our freedom of action than as an ultimate safeguard for your security and prosperity. It will mean rethinking not just the content of the rules themselves, but also how they are made and implemented.” (p.50)

He’s alert also to the dangers of “civilisational thinking”, something this Substack often reflects on.

“Notwithstanding their formal obeisance to the values of the UN Charter, member states claim priority for their own particular interpretations of human rights, democracy and international order. They invoke cultural and civilisational norms, in effect appropriating or ‘nationalizing’ international rules. Such relativism is death to the idea of a global order based on universal norms. If we return to Hedley Bull’s definition of international society as being founded on the appreciation of ‘certain common interests and common values,’ then such a society no longer exists. When Beijing talks up the diversity of political paths and civiliszational traditions, when Washington proclaims specifically American values, or when Mosow emphasizes Russia’s ‘traditional spiritual and moral values,’ they are demarkating the extent to which they feel bound by allegedly common norms. And that is very loosely indeed. The only rules they are prepared to countenance are those that do not constrain their ability to pursue national interests to the fullest extent possible.” (p. 41)

And realistic about the problems of “middle powers”.

The cases of Saudi Arabia and Brazil illustrate what might be called a middle-power trap. MBS and Lula envision their countries as more than regional powers. their horizons are global. Yet their foreign policies are conditioned and constrained by parochial views of the national interest. Thus, Riyadh allowed itself to become a scapegoats for the world’s failure to slow global warming, when a little more flexibility over language at COP summits could have positioned it as a mediator of compromise solutions. Its rigid approach reflects an insecurity common among middle powers: the fear they may be railroaded into unwanted courses of action unless they show ‘toughness’ at every juncture. Paradoxically, it is exactly this type of reflexive response that limits their options, damages their reputations, and stymies their global aspirations. Lula promotes Brazil as a leader of the Global South … but such recognition must be earned by adopting more forward-looking policies. Brazil can stick to its current high-emissions economic model [deforestation and cattle-farming]… or it can set a template for responsible - and advantageous -- middle power behaviour. What it can’t do is have it both ways: pursue a self-centred approach to global agenda issues like climate change and gain support for its claims to Global South leadership.” (pp. 106-7)

And Lo says, rightly, we cannot do without multilateral organisations.

“Any functioning international order needs effective multilateral institutions. The difficulty is getting there. It is not simply a matter of reforming the governance of existing organizations or setting up new structures. The biggest challenge is to persuade state and non-state actors to buy into an imperfect approach to problem-solving. … The key lies in flexibility - recognizing the virtues of choice and making use of the full range of multilateral instruments from the global to the minilateral. For what ultimately matters is the act of cooperation rather than the precise form it takes. Legitimacy and credibility from from performance.” (p 110)

But the Western “standard” is by no means any sort of gold model, as Lo points out.

“Western liberal democracies assess good institutional governance according to what they regard as universally applicable standards of efficiency, accountability and transparency. But for many nations, equitable representation, inclusiveness and democratic decision-making are more important considerations. … Nevertheless, all countries have an interest in developing a reasonable framework for cooperation. A function WHO is indispensible to the world’s ability to adapt to future pandemics… wiithout adequate funding, the WHO will never be the multilateral instution that(most) Western governments hope for. All sides have to give a little in order to gain a lot.” (pp. 113)

On dealing with the new information age, he reflects what I often say about the need to make politics that everyone is involved in, rather than has done to them. Which means education and support to enable, particularly, those who grew up in less digital ages, but also the young, to navigate the treacherous ground, while governments rein in the oligarchs.

“What is really required is a trransformation of the relationship between politics and information. The only viable approach to countering disinformation is one that is inclusive, whereby state and non-state actors keep each other relatively honest and the general public is actively involved. That requires government decisionmakers to embrace a vibrant public sphere; media conglomerates to recognize the benefits of competition and at least some regulation; and a shift away from current oligarchic arrangements.” (p. 138)

But there are places where I depart - very strongly - from agreement with Lo, particularly on human rights and the rule of law. He says:

“For the international order to work, whether as a force for stability or a foundation of problem solving, requires prioritising the sovereign rights of nations and the principle of non-interference…. Addressing challenges such as climate change will require all hands to the pump, regardless of political and ideological allegiance. Such a normative shift would be challenging for Western policy-makers still loyal to the liberal tradition. But there is no sensible alternative. Decades of lecturing foreign governments about their human rights records have proved fruitless. Liberal interventionism has been thoroughly counter-productive. And democracy-building in general has been marked by moral inconsistency, poor judgement and hubris. The sad fact is that the values of liberal humanism are not universal, indeed, they have been in steady retreat for nearly two decades, and are being eroded even within liberal democracies. None of this is to suggest that political repression and the violation of human rights do not matter. Rather, it is to recognize the limits of external action. If Western governments are unwilling to exercise influence over authoritarian allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, or, worse still, are bent on undermining democratic checks and balances in their own countries (Trumpian America) then what hope - or moral claim - do they have in complaining about abuses in, say, China?” (p. 67)

No, we can’t control what Putin or Xi do, but we can make it have a cost. That depends on the behaviour of our states, behaviour that has been notably weak over many decades.

How vulnerable are giant expensive pieces of kit like this in the age of drone warfare? Photo by Michael Afonso on Unsplash

Lo is also confident about the US’s future, its security, stability and power. “Contrary to popular perception, the United States is not in decline, anbd remains the pre-eminent power. It will play an outsize role in global affairs, regardless of who sits in the White House.” (p. 71)

That’s a matter more open to question, I would suggest, than many are prepared to consider. It is not just - although it is certainly a factor - state behaviour such as that of Customs and Border Control officials in shooting and killing Alex Pretti provoking an inevitable, and rightful, street and societal reaction, but more still the behaviour of Trump and his allies and supporters that calls into question the future stability of the state, and hence its ability to project force outwards. But it is also the fact that the US, through under-investment in infrastructure and human resources, may be the first country to, almost consciously, underdevelop itself, to greatly reduce its capacity to service the giant military machine.

And how much is the US military like that of Russia’s just after the invasion of Ukraine, when it was found that spending lots of money had not necessarily resulted in large quantities of effective military materiel? A senior Ukrainian military figure once told me that he thought the price of any weapon from the US was double the EU price for the same quality - pure corruption, pork-barrelling and featherbedding.

Lo also can only see two sides in international competition, authoritarianism and liberalism.

“Liberalism has no automatic right to respect. Its values and norms are not self-evidently superior. … The democracies of the West still count among the wealthiest and most technologically-advanced countries in the world. Their political, economic, normative and cultural ties remain strong, enabling them to coordinate their actions closely… It must also show some self-belief…. It is no coincidence that the heyday of liberalism’s international appeal came in the 1990s when it was the dominant philosophy within Western democracies. Self-belief, but not self-entitlement, is indispensible to its future.” (p. 150)

He’s right about liberalism of course, and its need to end any sense of entitlement, but that’s ultimately a very narrow view of the world, an old reductionist, Western-centric view that assumes two sides and two ways of thinking. Humans are never that simple.

One chapter in my next book starts with the reflection that we should look a great deal more to the thinkers of Vietnam, which brings together colonial influences, Chinese and South East Asian approaches, under the pressure of political and military conflict, in all kinds of interesting ways. And the book looks a great deal to indigenous thinking, very different approaches to human and more-than-human relations from societies that have survived far longer than our fragile, destructive systems.

Almost the end

After listening to the New Books Network podcast with three contributors to a volume of essays entitled Attensity! A Manifesto of the Attention Liberation Movement, it is definitely going on my “to read” list. And some of their terms may well appear in my speeches in the House of Lords soon, particularly the understanding of the activities of the tech giants as “extractivism”, or “human fracking”. The love and attention that should be going to other humans (and I’d add the more-than-human living world) is instead being extracted for the profit of the few. Their recipe about what to do is practical: redirect, whenever and however you can, time to real relationships, real world projects,

What did you think?

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